邢唷> &(%欹q` 餜N bjbjqPqP<::N Q 6   $ hP               X  0鋮魈 $  ! 0Q , ,? ?X ?X x        Q      2012 May Fudan University Michihiro KANDORITopics in Economic Theory This course covers selected topics in game theory and economics of information, with an emphasis on economic applications. Lecture Plans1. Moral Hazard 2. Adverse Selection and Mechanism Design 3. Auctions 4. Revenue Equivalence 5. Optimal Auction Design 6. The VCG Mechanism 7. Bargaining I: Alternating Offers 8. Bargaining II: Nash Bargaining Solution 9. Repeated Games I: Perfect Monitoring 10. Repeated Games II: Imperfect Public Monitoring 11. Repeated Games III: Imperfect Private Monitoring ReferencesMas-Colell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press Milgrom, P. Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press. Kandori, M., 揜epeated Games, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan. Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press. Kandori M. and I. Obara (2010)揟owards a Belief-Based Theory of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: An Application of POMDP,http//:mkandori.web.fc2.com/ ,-23FGA B M y  5 8 : X v / M N 猷臟蚤土櫫靈歸歸勃並查歸涢涢 h SRh(o h&h(oh]1h(oH*h]1h(o6 h]1h(ohGh(o6hh(o5>*CJ h(o5丆Jh7h(o5丆JaJh(o5丆JaJh(oh SRh(oCJaJh(oCJaJ! ,-GH  2 L a @ A $a$gd&$a$gd SR$a$gd SR$a$gd[T $d4$a$gd鷟q $da$gd SRN A B M N X M N $a$gd]1$a$gd SR :1恏2PP:plY皞. 捌A!哎"哎#惲$惀%癝班 惄J@J t<ck噀 $1$a$ CJKH_HaJmH nHsH tH$A@$ 貫祂=刉[SOBiB nf恏?]}    & 0 2 3 : !6"000 0 0 0000006:>兀﨑 =@\]^$([{  0 0 000000Y;[個dLL2?[T22012 MayKandori甠o(u7b 鄥燆鵒h珣+'遲0x  4 @ LX`hp 2012 MayKandori Normal.dot 微軟用戶2Microsoft Office Word@@P艆魈@P艆魈脹諟.摋+,0 X`px ToshibaL   !"#$'Root Entry F 嬰鋮魈)1Table OWordDocument<SummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObjm  FMicrosoft Office Word 文檔 MSWordDocWord.Document.89瞦