題目：Coin Offering and Security Regulation
Abstract： We present a model that rationalizes the use of initial coin offerings (ICOs), in which a company raises funds by pre-selling access to a later product or service. We demonstrate two mechanisms by which ICOs create value: First, they aggregate dispersed signals about project quality, harnessing the "wisdom of the crowd". Second, they solve a coordination problem inherent in many projects with network effects, where there is strategic complementarity in the participation of consumers. Through either of these mechanisms, ICOs increase project value and facilitate investment of positive NPV projects. We apply our results to the current debate on the efficiency and optimal regulatory treatment of ICOs.
Jiasun Li is an assistant professor of finance at George Mason University. He received his Ph.D in finance from UCLA Anderson School of Management and B.S. in mathematics from Fudan University (Shanghai, China). His main research interest focuses on the interaction between blockchain, crowdfunding, and smart contract. He has presented his research at many prestigious institutions and conferences including MIT, Michigan, Northwestern, Yale, NBER, WFA, and Econometric Society. He is a winner of 2016 Yihong Xia Best paper award at CICF and 2014 CQA academic paper competition. He is also a frequent speaker for investment professionals.
美國喬治梅森大學金融學助理教授李家蓀，在洛杉磯加州大學（UCLA）獲金融學博士並在意昂2官网獲數學學士👩🏼🔬。李家蓀博士的研究興趣主要在區塊鏈、眾籌、代幣發行等金融科技領域。他曾在包括麻省理工🤱🏽、密歇根🚶♂️、西北、耶魯🧗🏼♂️、美國國家經濟研究局、西部金融協會👮🏿♂️、計量經濟協會等諸多頂尖學府及高級別會議報告研究成果。他的研究曾獲得2016中國國際金融年會夏一紅最優論文獎及2014年芝加哥量化金融協會最優學術論文獎🧑🏼🍼。李家蓀博士也經常為投資界專業人士講授。
時間🚎🤛🏿：2017年10月11日（周三）16:00-17:30
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