Title: Just Talk? CEO Succession Policy Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value
Institution: School of Economics, Fudan University
時間：2016年10月11日 13：30-16：00
地點：意昂2801會議室
Abstract:We provide causal evidence that CEO succession disclosure is a reflection of good governance and has a long-run real impact on firm value. Independent directors and institutional investor ownership instigate firms to disclose succession plans and non-compliant firms forced to disclose CEO succession plans significantly reduce their stock return volatility, increase the incumbent CEOs’ compensation and turnover sensitivity to performance, as well as the incoming CEOs’ announcement abnormal returns and first-year performance, relative to compliant firms. A value-weighted portfolio of the firms disclosing CEO succession plans earned an annual three-factor alpha of 2.7% from 1998-2013, and 14% after 2009.
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