Review of Economic Studies (April 1, 2017) ，Jimmy Chan, Alessandro Lizzeri, Wing Suen, Leeat Yariv 發表文章 Deliberating Collective Decisions.

Deliberating Collective Decisions

Jimmy Chan

School of Economics, Fudan University

Alessandro Lizzeri

Department of Economics, NYU.

Wing Suen

School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong.

Leeat Yariv

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech.

內容簡介Abstract:

We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date, agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main insights emerge from our analysis and are consistent with an array of stylized facts regarding committee decision making. First, majority rule is more vulnerable than super-majority rules to the disproportionate influence of impatient committee members. Second, more diverse preferences, more patient members, or more unanimous decision voting rules lead to lengthier deliberation and more accurate decisions. Last, balanced committees unanimously prefer to delegate deliberation power to a moderate chairman rather than be governed by a rule such as unanimity.

Keywords：

sequential likelihood ratio test, optimal stopping, swing voters, collective learning

摘要✴️：

這篇文章我們展示了在異質的委員會中獲取一系列信息的動態模型。在每一期🧑‍🎤，參與者會選擇給兩個候選人的一個候選人投票🐶，或選擇繼續收集信息。當某一位候選人得到多數選票時🈷️，過程終止🌛。我們的分析有三個主要的發現，並且這些發現與一系列關於委員會決策製定的典型化事實相符🧏🏿‍♀️🧎‍♂️。首先🪢，簡單多數原則比絕對多數原則更容易受到不耐心的委員會成員因素的不成比例的影響。其次，更多元化的偏好，更耐心的成員，或者更統一的決策投票規則會使得協商過程更漫長，決策更精準。最後🕌，處於平衡狀態的委員會一致偏向於將協商權交給一位溫和的主席👷🏽‍♀️，而非全體一致通過的規則來決定最後的裁定結果。

關鍵詞:

序列似然比檢驗🧗🏼‍♀️；最優停時👨🏻‍✈️；中間選民；群體學習

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